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Belgian public finances, explained

Where the money comes from, where it goes, how Belgium compares and where it is heading.

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Key figures

Deficit, 2025
5.2%of GDP · provisional
Debt, 2025
107.9%of GDP · provisional
Interest charges, 2025
2.2%of GDP
Taxes and contributions, 2024
42.6%of GDP

01Deficit and debt(Chart 1 of 7)

In 2025 Belgium ran the widest deficit of the eight countries compared

Deficit and government debt: Belgium and its peers

General government, 2000–2025, % of GDP. Provisional: 2025 for all, and Belgium 2024.

Hollow points: provisional figures. Dotted lines: EU reference values (deficit of 3%, debt of 60% of GDP).

Source: Eurostat

  1. The top panel shows the balance: what the government collects minus what it spends, as a share of GDP. Below zero is a deficit.

  2. Belgium, in blue, has been in deficit every year since 2008. The gap peaked at 9.0% of GDP in 2020, the first year of the pandemic.

  3. In 2025 the deficit was 5.2% of GDP, against 2.9% for the euro area. France was next at 5.1%; Denmark ran a surplus of 2.9%.

  4. Deficits add up to debt. Belgium's debt fell from 109.7% of GDP in 2000 to 87.5% in 2007, then rose again with the financial crisis and the pandemic.

  5. In 2025 it stood at 107.9%, 20.5 percentage points above the euro-area average. Among the peers, only France's was higher.

About this chart

Source

Unit: % of GDP · Data pulled on 7 October 2026

What this does not show

This chart does not show the structural (cyclically adjusted) balance, which the current EU fiscal rules focus on, nor the split between levels of government (see the Entity I / Entity II chart), nor amounts in euro. The 3% and 60% lines are Treaty reference thresholds, not targets or judgements. The deficit also reflects the business cycle and interest charges, which are not separated here.

Caveats

  • The EDP table has no provisional flags. The deficit and debt notification table carries no status flags, even for the latest year notified in April 2026. That year should be treated as provisional, as flagged in the main aggregates table, and may be revised in the October notification.
  • Structural and nominal balances are different measures. The nominal balance (net lending/borrowing) is what is actually recorded. The structural balance removes the estimated effect of the business cycle and of one-off measures; it is an estimate that depends on the method and is revised often. EU fiscal rules focus on structural and net-expenditure measures.
  • Latest figures are provisional. Some of the figures used are flagged as provisional by the source and may still be revised, sometimes noticeably. Comparisons use by default the latest year with data for every country; the countries whose figures are provisional in that year are named.
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02Why it grows(Chart 2 of 7)

At unchanged policy, the deficit widens as interest charges rise, and ageing adds pressure after that

Why the deficit grows: interest and ageing

General government, % of GDP. Shaded areas: projections at unchanged policy, not forecasts. Top, the gap between the two lines is the interest bill.

Source: FPB · CEV

  1. The top panel splits the deficit in two. The upper line is the balance before interest, or primary balance; the lower line is the total. The gap between the two is the interest paid on the debt.

  2. If no new measures were taken, the Federal Planning Bureau projects the total deficit widening from 5.1% of GDP in 2025 to 6.4% in 2031, while interest charges rise from 2.2% to 3.5%.

  3. Before interest, the deficit is 2.9% in 2025 and 2.9% in 2031. So the widening comes from interest, but even without interest, spending would still exceed revenue.

  4. Over the longer term, the pressure is demographic. The Study Committee on Ageing projects social spending rising from 25.5% of GDP in 2024 to 27.2% in 2070, driven by pensions (11.2% to 12.0%) and health care (7.9% to 10.2%).

  5. Both are projections at unchanged policy, not forecasts: they leave out the measures now being negotiated.

About this chart

Source

Unit: % of GDP · Data pulled on 7 October 2026

What this does not show

These are not forecasts: the projections include no measure decided after their publication, including the budget under discussion in October 2026. The two sources have different dates and assumptions; their figures do not add up. The chart shows neither debt, nor the structural balance, nor the split between levels of government.

Caveats

  • A projection at unchanged policy is not a forecast. The Federal Planning Bureau and the Study Committee on Ageing project what would happen if current policy stayed as it is. They do not predict what governments will decide, so the projected deficits show the size of the challenge rather than the most likely outcome.
  • Projected years are inferred from the publication title. The FPB and ageing-committee workbooks do not mark which years are projected. The catalog flags years from 2026 as projections because the publications cover 2026 onwards; the latest observed years (2025) may themselves be partly estimates.
  • Structural and nominal balances are different measures. The nominal balance (net lending/borrowing) is what is actually recorded. The structural balance removes the estimated effect of the business cycle and of one-off measures; it is an estimate that depends on the method and is revised often. EU fiscal rules focus on structural and net-expenditure measures.
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03Benefits in the debate(Chart 3 of 7)

Invalidity has doubled since 2010, while unemployment benefits have more than halved since 2005

Two benefits in the debate: invalidity and unemployment

Top: people recognised as invalid on 31 December (INAMI), employees, unemployed and self-employed together; rate per 100 insured to 2023, the latest year published. Bottom: fully unemployed people paid by ONEM/RVA, integration benefits included, temporary unemployment excluded.

Source: INAMI · ONEM

  1. Invalidity starts when someone has been unable to work for more than a year. At the end of 2025, 576,643 employees, unemployed and self-employed people were in invalidity, against 278,071 in 2010.

  2. The number of insured people grew much less: per hundred insured, invalidity went from 6.4 in 2010 to 11.5 in 2023. An older workforce, the higher pension age, working conditions and the rules on returning to work are all part of the debate; these figures alone do not say which weighs most.

  3. Unemployment benefits moved the other way: 633,407 people a month on average in 2005, 291,249 in 2025. Part of the fall is the grey band, people exempt from looking for work, mostly older unemployed people; that status was phased out, from 160,232 in 2000 to 3,172.

  4. In 2025, 128,290 job-seekers on benefits had been unemployed for two years or more, 45% of the total. They are the group most directly concerned by the time limit on unemployment benefits that the federal government decided in 2025 and is phasing in from 2026.

About this chart

Source

Unit: Persons; per 100 insured; payment units · Data pulled on 7 October 2026

What this does not show

The chart does not count the first year of incapacity (primary incapacity), the amounts paid or the regions. It does not say why invalidity rises: an older workforce, a higher pension age, working conditions, health or the rules on returning to work are debated explanations these data cannot settle. ONEM payment units are neither persons nor ILO unemployed; the effects of the time limit on unemployment benefits, applied from 2026, are not visible yet.

Caveats

  • Primary incapacity (first year) is not invalidity (after one year). Sickness insurance pays primary incapacity benefits during the first year of work incapacity (after the employer's guaranteed wage for employees) and invalidity benefits once incapacity lasts more than a year and the medical council recognises the person as invalid. inami_incapacity counts only people in invalidity at 31 December; INAMI does not publish a year-end headcount of people in primary incapacity, only benefit days and amounts (inami_benefit_spending, phase PRIMARY, to 2023). Do not present the invalidity count as "all people on sick leave".
  • "Long-term sick" in the press usually means invalidity only. Press figures of about 500,000 "long-term sick" are usually the INAMI invalidity count for employees and unemployed people (537,728 at the end of 2025). Some add the self-employed (38,915) or people in primary incapacity, others count the general scheme only. Say which regime and which phase a number covers; add EMP and SELF for the whole insured population.
  • Persons, benefits and payments are different counts. A person can receive several benefits at once (a retirement and a survivor's pension, pensions from two schemes), and a count of benefit days or payments is not a count of people. Counts of pensions or benefits are therefore higher than the number of beneficiaries, and amounts divided by them give an amount per benefit, not per person. Say which of the three a figure counts and add benefits only when the source says each person is counted once.
  • Survey (ILO) unemployment is not the number of registered job-seekers. ILO unemployment comes from the labour force survey - people without work who searched for a job in the last four weeks and can start within two weeks. Registered unemployed job-seekers (Actiris, VDAB, Forem, ADG) and people receiving unemployment benefits (ONEM/RVA) are administrative counts with other rules; in Belgium they are clearly higher than the ILO figure. Do not mix the two or present one as the other.
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04Defence(Chart 4 of 7)

Belgium's defence spending jumped in 2025 but remains the lowest of the allies shown

Defence spending, Belgium and NATO allies

Defence expenditure on the NATO definition, % of GDP, 2014–2026. 2025, 2026: estimates (hollow points).

Source: NATO

  1. For years Belgium spent under one per cent of GDP on defence on NATO's definition: 0.9% in 2019. Spending rose to 1.3% in 2024, then to 2.0% in 2025, the level of NATO's 2014 pledge, shown by the lower dashed line.

  2. Allies raised spending too. In 2026 Belgium's estimate, 2.0%, is the lowest of the seven countries shown, against 2.5% on average for NATO Europe and Canada and 3.5% for Denmark, the highest. The upper line is the pledge allies made in 2025 for 2035.

  3. In the budget talks, higher defence spending adds to the savings or revenue that have to be found elsewhere.

About this chart

Source

Unit: % of GDP · Data pulled on 7 October 2026

What this does not show

Figures are reported by governments on the NATO definition, which includes for example military pensions; they differ from defence spending in the national accounts. Austria, not a member, is absent. The pledges are the allies' political targets, shown as markers; the chart does not say what level is adequate or how it is funded.

Caveats

  • Latest figures are provisional. Some of the figures used are flagged as provisional by the source and may still be revised, sometimes noticeably. Comparisons use by default the latest year with data for every country; the countries whose figures are provisional in that year are named.
  • Datasets of different vintages do not match exactly. Expenditure by function (September 2026) and the main aggregates and NBB accounts (July 2026) come from different releases, so the same total can differ slightly (e.g. Belgian 2024 spending of 335,288 vs 335,100 million euro). Compare within one dataset, or allow a tolerance of about 0.1%.
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05What is taxed(Chart 5 of 7)

Belgium taxes labour heavily and consumption lightly; its high capital taxes come mostly from company profits and property

What is taxed: labour, consumption and capital, 2024

Taxes and social contributions classified by what they fall on (European Commission), 2024. Implicit rate: revenue divided by the potential tax base.

Source: European Commission

  1. The European Commission sorts taxes and social contributions by what they fall on: labour, consumption or capital. The left panel shows each as a share of GDP in 2024.

  2. Taxes on capital raise 11.0% of GDP in Belgium, more than in any peer and above the EU's 8.5%. The gap comes from taxes on company profits, 4.4% against 3.3% in the EU, and on the stock of capital, such as property tax, registration duties and inheritance tax, 3.7% against 2.1%.

  3. Taxes on households' income from capital, such as interest and dividends, raise 0.9% of GDP, less than the EU's 1.1%. These are amounts, not rates: they do not say whether that income is taxed lightly or is small. Taxes on consumption raise 9.5%, less than in any peer; the EU figure is 10.6%.

  4. The right panel relates tax to its base. The implicit tax rate on labour is 40.7% in Belgium, level with Austria for the highest of the group, against 37.1% in the EU and 31.9% in the Netherlands. On consumption it is 15.5%, against 16.5% in the EU.

  5. These figures feed both sides of the budget debate, on taxing labour less and on taxing capital or consumption more. They do not show who ultimately bears each tax.

About this chart

Source

Unit: % of GDP; % · Data pulled on 7 October 2026

What this does not show

The split by base is a Commission estimate; some taxes are allocated by convention. The chart does not show who ultimately bears the tax, statutory rates, tax reductions, or how capital income is spread across households. The Commission no longer publishes an implicit tax rate on capital, hence amounts in % of GDP only.

Caveats

  • Spending through the tax system is not counted as spending. Support given through tax reductions (company cars, pension savings, housing loans, etc.) lowers revenue instead of raising expenditure. Countries that rely more on such tax expenditures look like lower spenders and lower taxers than they really are.
  • Euro-area aggregates with different compositions. EA21 is the euro area including Bulgaria (from 2026) and EA20 the composition of 2023-2025; both are back-calculated over the whole period with a fixed list of countries. Use EA21 by default and do not mix the two in one comparison.
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06Living on little(Chart 6 of 7)

Belgium's poverty-risk rate is the lowest of the group, but several minimum benefits are below the poverty line

Living on little: poverty risk and minimum incomes

Top: share of the population below 60% of median income, after social transfers (EU-SILC survey 2025). Bottom: net amount of the minimum benefits as % of the poverty line, single person (FPS Social Security).

Hollow points: provisional figures.

Source: Eurostat · FPS Social Security

  1. Budget choices on benefits and indexation weigh most on people with low incomes. In the 2025 survey, 10.9% of Belgium's population lived below the poverty line, which is set relative to median income: the lowest of the eight countries, against 16.3% in the EU.

  2. Children are more exposed: 14.5% of them live below the line, against 9.3% of older people.

  3. For a single person with no other income, three minimum benefits were below the poverty line in 2024: the integration income (84% of the line), the disability income allowance (86%) and the minimum unemployment benefit (91%). The minimum invalidity benefit and minimum pension were above it.

  4. All six rose relative to the poverty line since 2018; the integration income went from 73% to 84%.

About this chart

Source

Unit: %; % of the poverty line · Data pulled on 7 October 2026

What this does not show

Poverty risk is a relative measure, taken from a survey whose incomes refer to the previous year. The minimums are computed for a single person with no other income; other household types differ. The chart shows neither the effects of the budget measures under discussion nor the number of recipients of each minimum.

Caveats

  • Poverty figures refer to the previous year's income. The year shown is the year of the EU-SILC survey. In most countries the income measured is that of the previous calendar year, so policy changes show up in the figures with a delay.
  • Model-household amounts, not average benefits paid. These are FPS Social Security calculations for a model household living only on one minimum benefit, net of personal income tax and including holiday pay, child benefit and social supplements. They are not the average amount paid to recipients, not a gross statutory scale, and not the number of people on a minimum. Amounts depend on the household rate (single, cohabiting, with family). 2023 and 2024 shares of the poverty line rest on an estimated threshold (flag e).
  • Latest figures are provisional. Some of the figures used are flagged as provisional by the source and may still be revised, sometimes noticeably. Comparisons use by default the latest year with data for every country; the countries whose figures are provisional in that year are named.
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07Employment(Chart 7 of 7)

Belgium's employment rate has risen but stays below the EU average

Employment rate of people aged 20–64, Belgium and its Regions

People in work as % of the population aged 20-64, labour force survey, 2005–2025. Regions by place of residence. Series break in 2021.

Source: Eurostat

  1. More people in work means more tax and contribution revenue and less spending on benefits, which is why the employment rate comes up on all sides of the budget debate. In Belgium it rose from 66.5% of the working-age population in 2005 to 72.8% in 2025.

  2. That is still below the EU's 76.1% and below the target Belgium set itself for 2030, the dashed line.

  3. The rate differs by Region: 77.3% in Flanders, above the EU average, against 67.9% in Wallonia and 63.9% in Brussels. Regions count where people live, and many jobs in Brussels are held by commuters from the other two.

About this chart

Source

Unit: % of population · Data pulled on 7 October 2026

What this does not show

The employment rate says nothing about hours worked, wages or job quality. Regions are counted by place of residence: commuters into Brussels count in their own Region. The chart does not show people in invalidity or unemployment, nor the effect of employment on public finances.

Caveats

  • Break in the labour force survey in 2021. The EU labour force survey was reformed in 2021 (new questionnaire and definitions, Regulation 2019/1700), and several countries have other breaks (b flags; for Belgium also 1999, 2001, 2005, 2011 and 2017). Changes across a break year are partly statistical. For long trends in the 20-64 employment rate use employment_rate, which Eurostat adjusts for the breaks; elsewhere mention the break when a comparison spans it.
  • Regional labour rates are by place of residence. Regional employment and unemployment rates describe the residents of a region, wherever they work. Brussels has many more jobs than employed residents (a large share is filled by commuters from Flanders and Wallonia), so its low employment rate does not mean few jobs in Brussels.
  • Low-reliability survey estimates. Cells flagged u rest on few survey respondents (small provinces, young age groups, rare categories) and can move a lot from year to year. Report them with that warning and do not rank regions or countries on small differences between them.
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